RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Posted on : 03-06-2010 | By : JOHN BRUTON | In : Economic and Social policy Reforms
The financial crisis affecting banks and Governments is no more than a symptom of a deeper problem. That problem is a loss in relative competitiveness of both Europe and North America vis a vis the emerging economies of China, India, Brazil and others over the past twenty years. The loss of competitiveness was accompanied by an unwillingness to face up to long term problems like the eventual cost of ageing societies, and the ephemeral nature of some of the innovations of the so called “new economy”.
The boom- driven expansion of credit was like an anaesthetic that concealed an underlying loss in competitiveness from us until 2008. Now that the anaesthetic has been withdrawn, after such a long time, the pain is acute. The human cost is all too real.
The answer to this for all European countries is, I believe, to work to increase what economists would call the total factor productivity of our economy, the productivity of the way in which we use all our resources, public and private, capital and labour, tangible and intangible. We need a new way of thinking , an enhanced orientation towards finding ways to earn a living from meeting the needs of the rest of the world .
The West has spent significant amounts of money for the reconstruction of the Balkans. Overall assistance to southeastern Europe was significant, ranging between €6-6.5 billion per annum from 1995-2006. Aid peaked twice, as a response to post-conflict reconstruction: first in 1995-1997 due to the significant assistance given to Bosnia and Herzegovina (following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords) and secondly in 2001-2002 due to the considerable amounts of aid given to Kosovo after the NATO bombings. Bosnia received massive amounts of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. On average the country received about $730 million per year from 1996-2002. At $1,400 per head, assistance in the first two post-war years in Bosnia was higher than any other international state-building project since the Second World War. Kosovo also received massive amounts of financial aid in the 1999-2004 period: about $3.1 billion of international aid targeted mostly humanitarian priorities and helped rebuild most of the 120,000 houses destroyed in the violence. Significant assistance was also provided to Serbia after the end of the Milosevic era: from 2000-2005, Serbia received more the $3.5 billion. In total, throughout the last twenty years the European Union (European Commission and the member-states) provided about 66% of the assistance for the reconstruction of western Balkans and the United States about 15%. With regard to the relevant burden of the European Community and its member states, and with few exceptions (like Yugoslavia and Romania from 1991-1999), Community contributions were higher to much higher than all EU member states bilateral efforts taken together.
After the European elections last year, during these January days when temperatures are quite low in Brussels, the atmosphere among the commissioner-designates and their staff, Members of the European Parliament and the political public is becoming overheated. At first we were witness to a very wide range of atmospheres during hearings, ranging from relaxed to uncomfortable; both for candidates and for the audience alike. The speeches and answers of commissioners–designate often emphasised the common values of the European Union. So, what are these exactly? 
In 2009 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) celebrates its tenth anniversary. Throughout this decade, ESDP has been defined in relation to the existing system of collective security, NATO. As an expression of the quality of transatlantic relations in general, the relationship of ESDP and NATO has always been shaped by the following two contradictions. The first contradiction is the fact that the U.S. is demanding a more actively engaged Europe that is willing and able to bear a greater share of the burden of upholding the international order. At the same time, U.S. governments have been very reluctant in agreeing to a stronger and more independent political and military role for Europe. Europe is supposed to take more responsibility without gaining more say in political decisions. This is complemented by the European contradiction: Europeans demand exactly such a stronger political role for themselves while they remain unwilling to expand their (military) capabilities accordingly. They call for a responsibility they are not able to shoulder.
When the EU was established and many decades after, one of its most remarkable characteristics was that it was an internationally recognized civilian power, a player on the international level that was able to maintain its status and recognition without the promotion or use of military power. However, the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has raised widespread concerns over the EU’s identity as a civilian power and the gradual replacement of civilian power policy by military force. The Europeanization in the field of security and defence thus threatens to lead to a loss of control in executive decision-making on the use of military force by national parliaments which neither the European Parliament nor the former WEU have been able to compensate.
An agreement was tentatively reached on 21 October in Vienna between Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), France, Russia and the US. Details of the deal are still not public and the deal is not sealed yet (the Iranian delegation needs clearance from Tehran). Still, the general elements of the deal are known and they raise important questions and leave some critical matters of Iran’s nuclear dossier essentially unresolved. Iran has agreed to ship a significant share of its Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile to Russia for further enrichment. The fuel will then be processed into fuel rods and returned to Iran for use in its Tehran Research Reactor, under IAEA safeguards. Pending clarification of what additional elements the deal addresses and includes, here are five questions that presumably remain unanswered.
If one was asked this question, the answer
The release of a much anticipated EU-commissioned report into the causes of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 predictably spread the blame for the conflict around. Georgia got its share of the blame, but the text of the report is devastating to Russia’s narrative of the conflict. The Report faulted Georgia for its attack on Tskhinvali; but summarily and bluntly dismisses the entire Russian justification for its subsequent invasion, as well as its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Importantly, the report also warns against the dangers of the accepting rhetoric of ‘spheres of influence’. Whether this will result in any tangible implications remains more doubtful.
The massive, unprecedent fiscal and monetary stimulus undertaken by almost all governments and central banks in the last two years has prevented the 2008-2009 recession from turning into a second Great Depression. Policymakers and economists did not forecast the crisis, but they have been able so far to take it under control. So we should at least rejoice; the great depression of the 1930’s was not anticipated as well, but it was because of subsequent mistakes by authorities that it became so great! 
Recognizing the need to expand the U.S. broadband network to ensure America’s infrastructure and economic development, Congress tasked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with developing a national broadband plan by February 17, 2010.
