In 2009 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) celebrates its tenth anniversary. Throughout this decade, ESDP has been defined in relation to the existing system of collective security, NATO. As an expression of the quality of transatlantic relations in general, the relationship of ESDP and NATO has always been shaped by the following two contradictions. The first contradiction is the fact that the U.S. is demanding a more actively engaged Europe that is willing and able to bear a greater share of the burden of upholding the international order. At the same time, U.S. governments have been very reluctant in agreeing to a stronger and more independent political and military role for Europe. Europe is supposed to take more responsibility without gaining more say in political decisions. This is complemented by the European contradiction: Europeans demand exactly such a stronger political role for themselves while they remain unwilling to expand their (military) capabilities accordingly. They call for a responsibility they are not able to shoulder.

The map that helped the transatlantic partners to navigate these paradoxes described the primacy of NATO, expressed in the Five Nos: No decoupling, no balancing, no entrapment, no duplication, and no discrimination. ESDP must not diminish the role of NATO as the primary forum of Western security policy; ESDP mustnot lead to a unified European block opposing U.S. interests; ESDP mustnot force the U.S. to take on responsibilities outside the NATO area; ESDP mustnot duplicate existing NATO structures and capabilities; and ESDP must not lead to the isolation of those European NATO members who are not part of the EU.

By and large, European policy-makers stuck to these rules. After all, NATO remains Europe’s indispensable security provider. ESDP had to find its niche in specific mandates and as supporting actor. And it has done so, with 23 operations on three continents, focusing on peace keeping, border control, and crisis prevention missions. (Only six of the 23 missions have been of military nature.) But what does the second decade hold for ESDP or, as it is commonly called since Lisbon, CSDP? That depends on the Union’s readiness to address the three crucial ills plaguing CSDP.

First, there is the lack of political will. Time and again, EU member states have displayed very different attitudes regarding security and defense policy in general and specifically the use of military means. Hence, EU operations have been limited to rather low risk and low cost missions. What is necessary, though, is a European Union that can follow the strategic vision it laid out in the European Security Strategy: A truly global actor, determinedly engaged in fighting global threats.

Second, there is the perennial lack of defense spending, exacerbated by wasteful and unwise allocation of funds. Even though the EU member states agreed to invest more money in defense and military equipment needed for high risk, large scale missions, the expenditures for defence decreased in Europe during the last years, disappointing not only observers in the U.S. but also those Europeans who would like their Union to take on more international responsibilities. In times of economic and financial crisis, spending is unlikely to increase significantly, but at least a thorough review of options in pooling and better adjustment of strategic purpose and defense investment is mandatory.

Third, CSDP and NATO need to cooperate more smoothly (or  at all). Much of the problem liesonNATO’s side, such as the recalcitrance of Turkey that is blocking rapprochement of the institutions. Much can also be attributed to the usual transatlantic bickering. But these days, with an ever-more involved EU, lives are on the line. The parallel missions in Kosovo, for example, endanger the safety of our soldiers and police because the flow of information between the two institutions is so limited. Europeans within and without NATO should overcome their reluctance to coordinate CSDP and the Alliance – and be ready to accept the primacy of NATO in conflict situations. There will be no efficient provision of European security without it.